diff --git a/crates/sdk/src/signer/core.rs b/crates/sdk/src/signer/core.rs
index f0d51ca0..2fd6dac1 100644
--- a/crates/sdk/src/signer/core.rs
+++ b/crates/sdk/src/signer/core.rs
@@ -321,12 +321,25 @@ impl Signer {
         ))
     }
 
-    /// Verifies and finalizes a transaction against a strict target confirmation window (in blocks).
-    /// This function also assumes that the transaction already includes the coin selection.
+    /// Finalizes a transaction using only the inputs it already has, paying `fee_rate` sats/kvb.
+    ///
+    /// Unlike `Signer::finalize`, this doesn't add any wallet inputs or fetch a fee rate, so it
+    /// doesn't need a provider. Like `Signer::finalize`, it appends a fee output and, unless the
+    /// change would be too small to keep, a change output before it, then signs and runs every
+    /// program input. Returns the transaction and its fee.
     ///
     /// # Errors
-    /// Returns a `SignerError` if the assembled inputs do not meet dust limits or fail to cover the
-    /// dynamically estimated required fee.
+    /// - `SignerError::InvalidFeeRate` if `fee_rate` isn't a finite, non-negative number.
+    /// - `SignerError::UnknownInputAmount` if an input is confidential and has no unblinding secrets.
+    /// - `SignerError::DuplicateInput` if the transaction spends an outpoint twice.
+    /// - `SignerError::DustAmount` if the inputs don't exceed the outputs by at least [`MIN_FEE`] of
+    ///   the policy asset.
+    /// - `SignerError::NotEnoughFeeAmount` if that surplus can't pay the fee, or the fee and the
+    ///   smallest blinded change when the change can't be dropped.
+    /// - `SignerError::ConfidentialInputWithoutBlindedOutput` if the transaction spends a
+    ///   confidential input, has an explicit change target, and doesn't have any blinded output.
+    /// - `SignerError::Unbalanced` if an asset other than the policy asset doesn't balance.
+    /// - The errors of [`FinalTransaction::calculate_fee_delta`] and [`Signer::sign_tx`].
     pub fn finalize_strict(&self, tx: &FinalTransaction, fee_rate: f32) -> Result<(Transaction, u64), SignerError> {
         Self::check_known_amounts(tx)?;
         Self::check_unique_inputs(tx)?;
diff --git a/crates/sdk/src/transaction/utxo.rs b/crates/sdk/src/transaction/utxo.rs
index f3669225..b1de9bf5 100644
--- a/crates/sdk/src/transaction/utxo.rs
+++ b/crates/sdk/src/transaction/utxo.rs
@@ -63,21 +63,21 @@ impl UTXO {
         self.txout.value.explicit().expect("The UTXO's amount is not explicit")
     }
 
-    /// Retrieves the unblinded `AssetId` of the current UTXO.
+    /// Retrieves the unblinded `AssetId` from `secrets`.
     ///
     /// # Panics
-    ///
-    /// This function will panic if the UTXO is not blinded. The panic occurs when
-    /// `self.secrets` is `None`, as it expects the UTXO to be in an unblinded state to retrieve the `AssetId`.
+    /// Panics if `secrets` is `None`, which is the case for an explicit UTXO and for a
+    /// confidential one that hasn't been unblinded.
     #[must_use]
     pub fn unblinded_asset(&self) -> AssetId {
         self.secrets.expect("The UTXO is not unblinded").asset
     }
 
-    /// Retrieves the unblinded amount from the UTXO.
+    /// Retrieves the unblinded amount from `secrets`.
     ///
     /// # Panics
-    /// This function will panic if the UTXO is not confidential.
+    /// Panics if `secrets` is `None`, which is the case for an explicit UTXO and for a
+    /// confidential one that hasn't been unblinded.
     #[must_use]
     pub fn unblinded_amount(&self) -> u64 {
         self.secrets.expect("The UTXO is not unblinded").value