diff --git a/docs/generated/checks.md b/docs/generated/checks.md
index 772475bc0..69816475c 100644
--- a/docs/generated/checks.md
+++ b/docs/generated/checks.md
@@ -49,6 +49,24 @@ verbs:
 - ^watch$
 - ^*$
 ```
+## automount-service-account-token
+
+**Enabled by default**: No
+
+**Description**: Pod spec does not explicitly set automountServiceAccountToken: false. If the workload does not call the Kubernetes API, consider disabling automatic token mounting to reduce attack surface. Note: this checks the pod spec only — a ServiceAccount-level setting may also control this behavior.
+
+**Remediation**: Set automountServiceAccountToken: false in the pod spec if the workload does not need to interact with the Kubernetes API.
+
+**Template**: [cel-expression](templates.md#cel)
+
+**Parameters**:
+
+```yaml
+check: |
+  (!has(object.spec.template.spec.automountServiceAccountToken) ||
+   object.spec.template.spec.automountServiceAccountToken == true)
+  ? 'service account token is auto-mounted — set automountServiceAccountToken: false if not needed' : ''
+```
 ## cluster-admin-role-binding
 
 **Enabled by default**: No
@@ -255,9 +273,9 @@ forbiddenServiceTypes:
 
 **Enabled by default**: Yes
 
-**Description**: Alert on pods/deployment-likes with sharing host's network namespace
+**Description**: Alert on pods/deployment-likes sharing the host's network namespace. Pods with hostNetwork: true bypass service mesh mTLS, silently disabling encryption for inter-service traffic. They also gain access to network-level attacks against other pods on the same node.
 
-**Remediation**: Ensure the host's network namespace is not shared.
+**Remediation**: Ensure the host's network namespace is not shared. If host networking is required, be aware that service mesh mTLS is bypassed and consider alternative encryption for inter-service communication.
 
 **Template**: [host-network](templates.md#host-network)
 ## host-pid
@@ -284,6 +302,26 @@ forbiddenServiceTypes:
 ```yaml
 minReplicas: 3
 ```
+## init-container-security-gap
+
+**Enabled by default**: No
+
+**Description**: Init container does not set runAsNonRoot: true while the pod-level securityContext does. Init containers can run as root even when main containers are hardened via the pod-level security context.
+
+**Remediation**: Set runAsNonRoot: true in each init container's securityContext to match the pod-level restriction.
+
+**Template**: [cel-expression](templates.md#cel)
+
+**Parameters**:
+
+```yaml
+check: |
+  has(object.spec.template.spec.securityContext) && has(object.spec.template.spec.securityContext.runAsNonRoot) && object.spec.template.spec.securityContext.runAsNonRoot == true && has(object.spec.template.spec.initContainers) && object.spec.template.spec.initContainers.exists(c,
+    !has(c.securityContext) ||
+    !has(c.securityContext.runAsNonRoot) ||
+    c.securityContext.runAsNonRoot != true
+  ) ? 'init container may run as root despite pod-level runAsNonRoot — apply securityContext to init containers' : ''
+```
 ## invalid-target-ports
 
 **Enabled by default**: Yes
@@ -524,6 +562,29 @@ acceptedPriorityClassNames:
 **Remediation**: Ensure privileged ports [0, 1024] are not mapped within containers.
 
 **Template**: [privileged-ports](templates.md#privileged-ports)
+## projected-token-long-expiration
+
+**Enabled by default**: No
+
+**Description**: Projected service account token volume with expirationSeconds greater than 24 hours. Long-lived tokens extracted from compromised pods remain valid for extended periods.
+
+**Remediation**: Set expirationSeconds to 3600 (1 hour) or less unless the workload specifically requires longer token lifetimes.
+
+**Template**: [cel-expression](templates.md#cel)
+
+**Parameters**:
+
+```yaml
+check: |
+  has(object.spec.template.spec.volumes) && object.spec.template.spec.volumes.exists(v,
+    has(v.projected) &&
+    v.projected.sources.exists(s,
+      has(s.serviceAccountToken) &&
+      has(s.serviceAccountToken.expirationSeconds) &&
+      s.serviceAccountToken.expirationSeconds > 86400
+    )
+  ) ? 'projected SA token with expirationSeconds > 24h — stolen tokens persist' : ''
+```
 ## read-secret-from-env-var
 
 **Enabled by default**: No
diff --git a/e2etests/bats-tests.sh b/e2etests/bats-tests.sh
index 56dbeb06a..072f2cc43 100755
--- a/e2etests/bats-tests.sh
+++ b/e2etests/bats-tests.sh
@@ -98,6 +98,18 @@ get_value_from() {
   [[ "${count}" == "1" ]]
 }
 
+@test "automount-service-account-token" {
+  tmp="tests/checks/automount-service-account-token.yml"
+  cmd="${KUBE_LINTER_BIN} lint --include automount-service-account-token --do-not-auto-add-defaults --format json ${tmp}"
+  run ${cmd}
+
+  print_info "${status}" "${output}" "${cmd}" "${tmp}"
+  [ "$status" -eq 1 ]
+
+  count=$(get_value_from "${lines[0]}" '.Reports | length')
+  [[ "${count}" == "2" ]]
+}
+
 @test "cluster-admin-role-binding" {
   tmp="tests/checks/cluster-admin-role-binding.yml"
   cmd="${KUBE_LINTER_BIN} lint --include cluster-admin-role-binding --do-not-auto-add-defaults --format json ${tmp}"
@@ -435,6 +447,18 @@ get_value_from() {
   [[ "${count}" == "1" ]]
 }
 
+@test "init-container-security-gap" {
+  tmp="tests/checks/init-container-security-gap.yml"
+  cmd="${KUBE_LINTER_BIN} lint --include init-container-security-gap --do-not-auto-add-defaults --format json ${tmp}"
+  run ${cmd}
+
+  print_info "${status}" "${output}" "${cmd}" "${tmp}"
+  [ "$status" -eq 1 ]
+
+  count=$(get_value_from "${lines[0]}" '.Reports | length')
+  [[ "${count}" == "1" ]]
+}
+
 @test "invalid-target-ports" {
   tmp="tests/checks/invalid-target-ports.yaml"
   cmd="${KUBE_LINTER_BIN} lint --include invalid-target-ports --do-not-auto-add-defaults --format json ${tmp}"
@@ -815,6 +839,18 @@ get_value_from() {
   [[ "${count}" == "2" ]]
 }
 
+@test "projected-token-long-expiration" {
+  tmp="tests/checks/projected-token-long-expiration.yml"
+  cmd="${KUBE_LINTER_BIN} lint --include projected-token-long-expiration --do-not-auto-add-defaults --format json ${tmp}"
+  run ${cmd}
+
+  print_info "${status}" "${output}" "${cmd}" "${tmp}"
+  [ "$status" -eq 1 ]
+
+  count=$(get_value_from "${lines[0]}" '.Reports | length')
+  [[ "${count}" == "1" ]]
+}
+
 @test "read-secret-from-env-var" {
   tmp="tests/checks/read-secret-from-env-var.yml"
   cmd="${KUBE_LINTER_BIN} lint --include read-secret-from-env-var --do-not-auto-add-defaults --format json ${tmp}"
diff --git a/pkg/builtinchecks/yamls/automount-service-account-token.yaml b/pkg/builtinchecks/yamls/automount-service-account-token.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..93ce56eb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pkg/builtinchecks/yamls/automount-service-account-token.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+name: automount-service-account-token
+description: >-
+  Pod spec does not explicitly set automountServiceAccountToken: false.
+  If the workload does not call the Kubernetes API, consider disabling
+  automatic token mounting to reduce attack surface. Note: this checks
+  the pod spec only — a ServiceAccount-level setting may also control
+  this behavior.
+remediation: >-
+  Set automountServiceAccountToken: false in the pod spec if the workload
+  does not need to interact with the Kubernetes API.
+scope:
+  objectKinds:
+    - DeploymentLike
+template: cel-expression
+params:
+  check: >
+    (!has(object.spec.template.spec.automountServiceAccountToken) ||
+     object.spec.template.spec.automountServiceAccountToken == true)
+    ? 'service account token is auto-mounted — set automountServiceAccountToken: false if not needed' : ''
diff --git a/pkg/builtinchecks/yamls/hostnetwork.yaml b/pkg/builtinchecks/yamls/hostnetwork.yaml
index 15adc3aa6..068e533c8 100644
--- a/pkg/builtinchecks/yamls/hostnetwork.yaml
+++ b/pkg/builtinchecks/yamls/hostnetwork.yaml
@@ -1,6 +1,13 @@
 name: "host-network"
-description: "Alert on pods/deployment-likes with sharing host's network namespace"
-remediation: "Ensure the host's network namespace is not shared."
+description: >-
+  Alert on pods/deployment-likes sharing the host's network namespace.
+  Pods with hostNetwork: true bypass service mesh mTLS, silently disabling
+  encryption for inter-service traffic. They also gain access to
+  network-level attacks against other pods on the same node.
+remediation: >-
+  Ensure the host's network namespace is not shared. If host networking
+  is required, be aware that service mesh mTLS is bypassed and consider
+  alternative encryption for inter-service communication.
 scope:
   objectKinds:
     - DeploymentLike
diff --git a/pkg/builtinchecks/yamls/init-container-security-gap.yaml b/pkg/builtinchecks/yamls/init-container-security-gap.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7e6c525a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pkg/builtinchecks/yamls/init-container-security-gap.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+name: init-container-security-gap
+description: >-
+  Init container does not set runAsNonRoot: true while the pod-level
+  securityContext does. Init containers can run as root even when main
+  containers are hardened via the pod-level security context.
+remediation: >-
+  Set runAsNonRoot: true in each init container's securityContext to match
+  the pod-level restriction.
+scope:
+  objectKinds:
+    - DeploymentLike
+template: cel-expression
+params:
+  check: >
+    has(object.spec.template.spec.securityContext) &&
+    has(object.spec.template.spec.securityContext.runAsNonRoot) &&
+    object.spec.template.spec.securityContext.runAsNonRoot == true &&
+    has(object.spec.template.spec.initContainers) &&
+    object.spec.template.spec.initContainers.exists(c,
+      !has(c.securityContext) ||
+      !has(c.securityContext.runAsNonRoot) ||
+      c.securityContext.runAsNonRoot != true
+    ) ? 'init container may run as root despite pod-level runAsNonRoot — apply securityContext to init containers' : ''
diff --git a/pkg/builtinchecks/yamls/projected-token-long-expiration.yaml b/pkg/builtinchecks/yamls/projected-token-long-expiration.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c50ef9c6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pkg/builtinchecks/yamls/projected-token-long-expiration.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+name: projected-token-long-expiration
+description: >-
+  Projected service account token volume with expirationSeconds greater
+  than 24 hours. Long-lived tokens extracted from compromised pods remain
+  valid for extended periods.
+remediation: >-
+  Set expirationSeconds to 3600 (1 hour) or less unless the workload
+  specifically requires longer token lifetimes.
+scope:
+  objectKinds:
+    - DeploymentLike
+template: cel-expression
+params:
+  check: >
+    has(object.spec.template.spec.volumes) &&
+    object.spec.template.spec.volumes.exists(v,
+      has(v.projected) &&
+      v.projected.sources.exists(s,
+        has(s.serviceAccountToken) &&
+        has(s.serviceAccountToken.expirationSeconds) &&
+        s.serviceAccountToken.expirationSeconds > 86400
+      )
+    ) ? 'projected SA token with expirationSeconds > 24h — stolen tokens persist' : ''
diff --git a/tests/checks/automount-service-account-token.yml b/tests/checks/automount-service-account-token.yml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..85d9eabbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/checks/automount-service-account-token.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: dont-fire
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
+      containers:
+        - name: app
+          image: app:v1
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: fire-default-mount
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      containers:
+        - name: app
+          image: app:v1
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: fire-explicit-true
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      automountServiceAccountToken: true
+      containers:
+        - name: app
+          image: app:v1
diff --git a/tests/checks/init-container-security-gap.yml b/tests/checks/init-container-security-gap.yml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..921de6513
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/checks/init-container-security-gap.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: dont-fire-no-init
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+      containers:
+        - name: app
+          image: app:v1
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: dont-fire-init-hardened
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+      initContainers:
+        - name: init
+          image: init:v1
+          securityContext:
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+      containers:
+        - name: app
+          image: app:v1
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: fire-init-no-security-context
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+      initContainers:
+        - name: init
+          image: init:v1
+      containers:
+        - name: app
+          image: app:v1
diff --git a/tests/checks/projected-token-long-expiration.yml b/tests/checks/projected-token-long-expiration.yml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e7d45a93e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/checks/projected-token-long-expiration.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: dont-fire-short-token
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      containers:
+        - name: app
+          image: app:v1
+      volumes:
+        - name: token
+          projected:
+            sources:
+              - serviceAccountToken:
+                  expirationSeconds: 3600
+                  path: token
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: fire-long-token
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      containers:
+        - name: app
+          image: app:v1
+      volumes:
+        - name: token
+          projected:
+            sources:
+              - serviceAccountToken:
+                  expirationSeconds: 604800
+                  path: token