Please report security vulnerabilities in decision-os-min privately. Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.
- Preferred: open a private advisory via GitHub Security Advisories ("Security" tab → "Report a vulnerability") on this repository.
- Alternatively, email the maintainer at nikzadpars@gmail.com with the details and, where possible, a minimal reproduction.
Please include:
- a description of the issue and its impact,
- the affected version or commit,
- steps to reproduce (a runnable proof-of-concept is ideal),
- any known mitigations.
- We aim to acknowledge a report within 7 days.
- We will keep you informed as we investigate and work on a fix.
- We ask that you give us a reasonable opportunity to release a fix before any public disclosure (coordinated disclosure).
There is no bug-bounty program; this project offers no monetary reward for reports. We are grateful for responsible disclosure and will credit reporters who wish to be acknowledged.
| Asset | Risk | Control |
|---|---|---|
Signing key (DECISION_OS_KEY_FILE / key_path) |
Anyone holding it can mint valid decisions | Created with mode 0600 via O_EXCL (race-safe, never world-readable); keep it on a volume only the kernel process can read; rotate by deploying a new key and treating older decisions as expired (they live 30s). Without key_path the identity is ephemeral and restarts invalidate every outstanding decision. |
| Spent-token store | In-memory store lets a captured decision be replayed after restart or on another replica | Use FileSpentStore / SqliteSpentStore on one shared volume (atomic, fsync'd, fails closed with SpentStoreUnavailable). It is not distributed consensus: replicas on separate disks would each accept a token once; implement SpentStore over a shared DB/Redis for that. Covered by the multi-process test in tests/test_identity_and_concurrency.py. |
| Audit log | Tampering or truncation | Hash-chained append-only log; ship copies off-host, since an attacker with disk write can truncate the tail. |
| Agent process | Bypassing the executor | The guarantee holds only if the agent cannot reach the tools except through the executor (see docs/HOSTED_AGENT_PLANE.md). |
Out of scope: a compromised kernel host, a malicious policy author, and side channels.
This project is pre-1.0 and under active development. Only the latest released version on the default branch receives security fixes.
This repository is one component of the Decision OS. Its security properties are
verified in isolation and, where applicable, under the cross-repo composition
harness. See the repository README.md for the documented scope and honest
limitations of the threat model — in particular, guarantees that hold in
isolation may depend on assumptions about how the component is deployed and
composed.