spike(identity): prototype cross-server brokerage - #1512
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Why
Chatto needs a concrete way to evaluate whether accounts on independent servers
can self-verify as the same user without exposing email addresses, trusting a
shared broker, or asking users to manage a persistent identity key. This spike
turns the protocol discussion into an adversarial, executable proof of concept.
What changed
cli/internal/identitybrokerGo package; it is not connectedto production APIs, persistence, or the frontend.
sponsors on distinct server origins.
keys, exact length-prefixed canonical signing bytes, genesis-derived group
IDs, bounded credential lifetimes, and idempotent approval/finalization.
against verified local group state before committing it.
clean client, including an HTTP integration test spanning 20 server origins.
RUNTIME_STATE/EVTproduction mapping, and unresolved recovery, rotation, privacy, and APIquestions.
The adversarial review loop fixed discovery-origin poisoning, post-revocation
backdating and selective disclosure, parallel-genesis aliasing, ceremony-key
substitution, unbounded lifetimes, and invalid revocation poisoning. The final
review found no remaining high- or medium-severity issues.
Compatibility and rollout
user-facing behavior changes.
state. An ADR/FDR and production key/storage design are required before
integration.
Test plan
mise test-climise license-checkmise x -- go test ./internal/identitybroker -count=1 -timeout 60smise x -- go test -race ./internal/identitybroker -count=1 -timeout 90smise x -- go vet ./internal/identitybrokermise x -- go test ./internal/identitybroker -shuffle=on -count=20 -timeout 90smise x -- go test -race ./internal/identitybroker -shuffle=on -count=5 -timeout 120sCloses #1508.