RePERS is a local-first repository harness. It does not run a network service or publish to a package registry. The threat surface is the installer, the pre-commit hook, the capability scripts, and the templates copied into receiver repos.

Don't open a public issue. Use GitHub's private channel:

https://github.com/coolsocket/repers/security/advisories/new

If that's unavailable, contact the maintainer via the email in git log (most recent maintainer commit's Author:). Do not include secrets, private repository contents, or full local paths unless required to reproduce.

• Affected file path + RePERS version (from .codex-plugin/plugin.json).
• Clear description of the vulnerability + proof-of-concept (if you have one).
• Your assessment of severity (local code execution? privilege boundary crossing? install-time tampering? evidence forgery?).

• Initial acknowledgment within 72 hours.
• Coordinated disclosure — patched release ships before the advisory becomes public.
• Public credit unless you ask to remain anonymous.

These deserve the closest review by anyone auditing this code:

• .repers/scripts/install_repers.py — runs at receiver install time. Writes files into the receiver's working tree and optionally registers a Git pre-commit hook. Pay attention to:

  • Path traversal in --target argument.
  • Symlink races during extraction.
  • Hook-policy default (warn, not strict) — opt-in escalation only.

• .repers/hooks/pre-commit — runs in the receiver's repo before every commit if installed. Must not assume hostile-free working tree. Avoid:

  • Untrusted command construction from staged file paths.
  • Long-running operations that block commits indefinitely.

• .repers/scripts/repers.py subcommands — each runs locally with the invoking user's privileges. The dispatch and run subcommands shell out for worker-command execution. Pay attention to:

  • Argument quoting in subprocess calls.
  • Target-file boundary enforcement (a worker writing outside its declared target_files is the orchestration-safety bug we explicitly guard against).

• .repers/capabilities/registry.json — paths and commands here are surfaced verbatim by preflight. A malicious registry entry is a malicious command suggestion. Treat any PR touching this file as security-sensitive.

• .repers/templates/** — copied verbatim into receiver projects by the installer. A malicious template = malicious code in every receiver.

• dist/repers-release-pack.zip — the transferable handoff. Any receiver verifying a pack trusts the embedded repers-verify-all.json. The release-pack-verify gate must re-execute verification against the extracted contents rather than trusting the embedded JSON verbatim.

• Vulnerabilities in receiver projects that adopt RePERS — those belong to the receiver.
• Issues in tools RePERS shells out to (git, python, optional codegraph).
• Cosmetic markdown / docs issues (use a regular issue).

Run the receiver status gate after install:

python .repers/scripts/repers.py bundle-status --json

Run the full package gate before sharing a bundle:

python .repers/scripts/repers.py bundle-status --package --verify-roundtrip --json

Thank you for keeping RePERS users safe.