Update npm package sanitize-html to v2.17.5 [SECURITY]

[hash-worker]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
sanitize-html (source)	2.17.4 → 2.17.5

---

sanitize-html has incomplete URI scheme validation in that allows javascript: URIs through action, formaction, data, poster, and background attributes

CVE-2026-53606 / GHSA-vccv-cmxp-4j9h

More information

Details

Summary

sanitize-html uses allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes (default: ['href', 'src', 'cite']) to gate the naughtyHref() function that blocks dangerous URI schemes like javascript: and vbscript:. The HTML specification defines 10+ attributes that accept URIs (action, formaction, data, poster, background, ping, xlink:href, dynsrc, lowsrc), but none of these are included in the default gate list. When a developer allows any of these attributes in their configuration, javascript: URIs pass through completely unmodified, enabling XSS.

The library has zero awareness of these URI-bearing attributes — none appear anywhere in the 854-line source file (verified by grep). No warning mechanism exists, and the README provides no security guidance about expanding allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes when allowing form or media attributes.

Severity

Exploitation requires non-default configuration: the developer must explicitly allow a non-default tag (e.g., form) AND a non-default attribute (e.g., action). Default configuration is NOT vulnerable. However, this is a common configuration pattern for CMS platforms, form builders, and rich content editors.

Affected Versions

All versions of sanitize-html from v1.18.0 (which introduced allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes) through at least v2.17.2. The default list has been ['href', 'src', 'cite'] since introduction and has never been expanded.

Root Cause

File: index.js:329 (sanitize-html 2.10.0, confirmed same in 2.17.x)

// Line 329 — The gate that controls scheme validation
if (options.allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes.indexOf(a) >= 0) {
    if (naughtyHref(name, value)) {
        delete frame.attribs[a];
        return;
    }
}

Default list at line 829:

allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes: ['href', 'src', 'cite'],

The naughtyHref() function (lines 627-667) correctly blocks javascript:, vbscript:, and other dangerous schemes. However, it has exactly 2 call sites in the entire codebase (lines 330 and 395), both inside the indexOf gate. There is no ungated path.

When attribute name is action, formaction, data, poster, background, etc.:

• indexOf('action') returns -1
• The if block is skipped entirely
• naughtyHref() is never called
• javascript:alert(1) passes through unmodified

The escapeHtml() function at line 464 provides no defense — it only encodes & < > " characters, which are not present in javascript:alert(1).

Data Flow:

Attacker input: <form action="javascript:alert(document.cookie)">
1. htmlparser2 parses → tag='form', attribs={action:'javascript:alert(document.cookie)'}
2. index.js:298 → allowedAttributes check: 'action' in developer config → PASS
3. index.js:329 → ['href','src','cite'].indexOf('action') → -1 → SKIP naughtyHref()
4. index.js:464 → escapeHtml('javascript:alert(document.cookie)') → unchanged
5. OUTPUT: <form action="javascript:alert(document.cookie)">

Steps to Reproduce

const sanitize = require('sanitize-html');

// ===== VECTOR 1: form action (100% reliable, all modern browsers) =====
const v1 = sanitize(
    '<form action="javascript:alert(document.cookie)"><button>Submit</button></form>',
    {
        allowedTags: ['form', 'button'],
        allowedAttributes: { form: ['action'] }
    }
);
console.log('V1 (action):', v1);
// OUTPUT: <form action="javascript:alert(document.cookie)"><button>Submit</button></form>
// XSS triggers when user submits the form

// ===== VECTOR 2: button formaction (100% reliable) =====
const v2 = sanitize(
    '<button formaction="javascript:alert(1)">Click</button>',
    {
        allowedTags: ['button'],
        allowedAttributes: { button: ['formaction'] }
    }
);
console.log('V2 (formaction):', v2);
// OUTPUT: <button formaction="javascript:alert(1)">Click</button>

// ===== VECTOR 3: object data =====
const v3 = sanitize(
    '<object data="javascript:alert(1)"></object>',
    {
        allowedTags: ['object'],
        allowedAttributes: { object: ['data'] }
    }
);
console.log('V3 (data):', v3);
// OUTPUT: <object data="javascript:alert(1)"></object>

// ===== CONTROL: href IS scheme-checked (expected behavior) =====
const ctrl = sanitize(
    '<a href="javascript:alert(1)">click</a>',
    {
        allowedTags: ['a'],
        allowedAttributes: { a: ['href'] }
    }
);
console.log('Control (href):', ctrl);
// OUTPUT: <a>click</a>   ← href correctly stripped by naughtyHref()

Observed behavior: javascript: preserved on action/formaction/data but correctly stripped on href.

Expected behavior: javascript: should be stripped on ALL URI-bearing attributes, or at minimum, the library should warn developers when they allow URI-bearing attributes not covered by scheme validation.

Impact

An attacker can achieve XSS in applications that use sanitize-html with non-default configurations allowing URI-bearing attributes:

• <form action="javascript:..."> — XSS on form submission (all modern browsers)
• <button formaction="javascript:..."> — per-button XSS override (all modern browsers)
• <object data="javascript:..."> — object load XSS (Chrome, Firefox)
• <video poster="javascript:..."> — limited browser support but spec-valid

Common vulnerable configurations:

• CMS platforms allowing form elements for user-generated content
• Form builder applications
• Rich text editors with extended tag allowlists
• Email template editors allowing media/embed tags

Mitigating factors:

• Default configuration is NOT vulnerable
• Requires double opt-in: non-default tag + non-default attribute
• CSP form-action directive mitigates form-based vectors
• Developers CAN manually add attributes to allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes

Remediation

Option 1 (Recommended): Expand the default allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes list:

// index.js line 829, change from:
allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes: ['href', 'src', 'cite'],

// to:
allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes: [
    'href', 'src', 'cite', 'action', 'formaction',
    'data', 'poster', 'background', 'ping',
    'xlink:href', 'dynsrc', 'lowsrc'
],

Option 2: Apply naughtyHref() to ALL attributes by default (invert the gate logic).

Option 3: Add a runtime warning when developers allow URI-bearing attributes not in allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes (analogous to vulnerableTags warning for script/style at lines 124-129).

Reporter

Kevin Lee (Changseon Lee)
OPCIA Corp. / PeanutAI Inc.
Seoul, South Korea
GitHub: crattack

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.4 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-vccv-cmxp-4j9h
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53606
• https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/pull/5464
• https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/5a88e9630cbbdde33154ef8abe7557ddf7be418b
• https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/sanitize-html@2.17.5
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vccv-cmxp-4j9h

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

apostrophecms/apostrophe (sanitize-html)

v2.17.5

Compare Source

Security

• Added a number of new attributes to be protected against unsafe URLs, e.g. javascript: and similar. None of these are used in the default configuration of sanitize-html or apostrophe or likely to be used there, and some attributes, like an action for a form, are inherently unsafe to allow if XSS protection is your goal. Nevertheless it makes sense to block certain URL types where they are not appropriate. Some attributes are not supported at all by modern browsers but are included for completeness. Thanks to crattack for reporting the vulnerability.
• Address a potential vulnerability when nonTextTags is configured in a nonstandard way. While it is never a good idea to remove known non-text tags from the standard list e.g. script, styles, etc., this change ensures that doing so does not result in nested tags being passed through without sanitization when they are not expressly allowed. (ApostropheCMS would never trigger this situation.) Thanks to Dipanshu singh for pointing out the issue and contributing the fix.

---

Configuration

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---

This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate.

[hash-worker]

⚠️ Artifact update problem

Renovate failed to update an artifact related to this branch. You probably do not want to merge this PR as-is.

♻ Renovate will retry this branch, including artifacts, only when one of the following happens:

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The artifact failure details are included below:

File name: yarn.lock

error This project's package.json defines "packageManager": "yarn@4.16.0". However the current global version of Yarn is 1.22.22.

Presence of the "packageManager" field indicates that the project is meant to be used with Corepack, a tool included by default with all official Node.js distributions starting from 16.9 and 14.19.
Corepack must currently be enabled by running corepack enable in your terminal. For more information, check out https://yarnpkg.com/corepack.

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Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
hash	Error		Aug 1, 2026 4:51am

2 Skipped Deployments

Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
hashdotdesign-tokens	Ignored	Preview	Aug 1, 2026 4:51am
petrinaut	Skipped		Aug 1, 2026 4:51am

[cursor]

PR Summary

Low Risk
Patch-version dependency-only change with no code edits; low integration risk, though any sanitize-html upgrade can subtly affect HTML output for custom allowlists.

Overview
Bumps sanitize-html from 2.17.4 to 2.17.5 in apps/hash-api and apps/hash-ai-worker-ts only—no application source changes.

2.17.5 addresses CVE-2026-53606: URI scheme checks now cover more attributes (e.g. action, formaction, data) so javascript: and similar schemes are less likely to slip through when those attributes are allowed in custom configs. HASH still uses this library for oEmbed HTML, org invite text, and AI worker HTML sanitization; behavior should stay the same unless you rely on permissive allowlists for those URI attributes.

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Cursor Bugbot has reviewed your changes and found 1 potential issue.

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[cursor]

Lockfile omits security upgrade

High Severity

package.json bumps sanitize-html to 2.17.5, but yarn.lock still resolves and pins sanitize-html@2.17.4. With Yarn’s --immutable installs, CI will reject the mismatch; if installs are forced through, the CVE-2026-53606 fix never lands and the vulnerable package remains in use.

Additional Locations (1)

• apps/hash-api/package.json#L109-L110

 

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