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CVE backports - #411

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reshke wants to merge 9 commits into
OPENGPDB_STABLEfrom
cve_backport
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CVE backports#411
reshke wants to merge 9 commits into
OPENGPDB_STABLEfrom
cve_backport

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@reshke reshke commented Aug 18, 2026

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Here are some reminders before you submit the pull request

  • Add tests for the change
  • Document changes
  • Communicate in the mailing list if needed
  • Pass make installcheck
  • Review a PR in return to support the community

MasahikoSawada and others added 9 commits August 18, 2026 09:28
setup_regexp_matches() sizes the buffer used to convert matched
substrings back from pg_wchar form at the smaller of maxlen*eml and
the original string's byte length, on the assumption that such a
conversion cannot produce more bytes than the string it came
from. That assumption holds only for validly encoded input. But
pg_mb2wchar_with_len() silently accepts bytes that are invalid in the
database encoding, turning each such byte into one pg_wchar, and
converting that back can take more bytes than the input did. A string
made of such bytes therefore overruns the conversion buffer by up to
its own length, corrupting the following memory. regexp_match(),
regexp_matches(), regexp_split_to_table() and regexp_split_to_array()
are all affected.

Fix by dropping the tighter bound and always allocating maxlen*eml + 1
bytes.

Reported-by: Francesco Verardi <frevadiscor89@gmail.com>
Author: Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Backpatch-through: 14
Security: CVE-2026-14664
The CACHESIGN.sign field is a BITVECP, not a TRGM, so you should not
use GETSIGN() on it. You don't get a compiler warning because the
GETSIGN() macro includes a cast. It resulted in a bogus read beyond
end of buffer, which would cause bad split decisions or a crash if
you're very unlucky.

Reported-by: Mehmet D. INCE <mehmet@mehmetince.net>
Backpatch-through: 14
Security: CVE-2026-14678
A grantee of amcheck function EXECUTE privilege could execute arbitrary
functions as the owners of expression indexes that depend on the search
path.  An expression like (lower(col)) was not vulnerable, because
lower() is resolved at CREATE INDEX time.  However, an expression
calling an sql-language or plpgsql-language function often was
vulnerable, even if it used search_path only to find objects in
pg_catalog.  The amcheck documentation has been warning about data
disclosure after such a GRANT, not about function execution.

This might cause new amcheck errors when index expressions rely on a
broader search_path.  Such indexes have seen errors during auto-analyze
since CVE-2018-1058 commit 582edc3, and
v17 amcheck always worked this way.  Hence, the risk is low.

Leave a comment on the one other sandbox entrance that doesn't empty
search_path.  In its case, the choice was valid.

Back-patch to v14 (all supported versions), but v17 was safe already.
Commit 2af07e2f749a9208ca1ed84fa1d8fe0e75833288 (v17) unintentionally
blocked the attack, and commit d70b17636ddf1ea2c71d1c7bc477372b36ccb66b
(v18) unintentionally removed that protection.  Hence, this adds to v17
just a test and a comment.  While emptying search_path became more
widespread in commit 2af07e2f749a9208ca1ed84fa1d8fe0e75833288 (v17),
none of its other changes blocked an attack available in v16, even when
considering GRANT.  For example, brin_summarize_range() has had an owner
check that GRANT does not override.

Reported-by: 王跃林 <violin0613@tju.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Jacob Brazeal <jacob.brazeal@gmail.com>
Backpatch-through: 14
Security: CVE-2026-14673
levenshtein() and levenshtein_less_equal() let the caller specify
the insertion, deletion, and substitution costs, and
fuzzystrmatch's corresponding SQL functions accept any 32-bit
integer for each.  Since the distances are calculated with 32-bit
arithmetic, large costs can cause overflows, thereby producing
nonsensical results.  Certain inputs to levenshtein_less_equal()
can even cause out-of-bounds writes.  To fix, use 64-bit arithmetic
instead, and error whenever the final result won't fit in the
returned 32-bit integer.

We may want to teach these functions to reject negative costs, too,
but that didn't seem appropriate for a security fix, and therefore
it is left as a future exercise.

Reported-by: Ben Morris in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic Research
Author: Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dean Rasheed <dean.a.rasheed@gmail.com>
Security: CVE-2026-15742
Backpatch-through: 14
This omission allowed roles without USAGE on a type to create range
types that depend on it, which could prevent the owner from
changing the type later.

Reported-by: Jingzhou Fu <fuboat@outlook.com>
Author: Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
Reviewed-by: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
Security: CVE-2026-6470
Backpatch-through: 14
This omission allowed roles without USAGE on a type to create
tables that depend on it, which could prevent the owner from
changing the type later.

Reported-by: Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart@gmail.com>
Author: Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
Security: CVE-2026-6470
Backpatch-through: 14
PGP encryption was using px_cipher_encrypt without checking if any
error was returned.  When OpenSSL is running in FIPS mode, or when
the legacy provider hasn't been loaded, not all ciphers which are
supported by the PGP code are available and fail the init step in
px_cipher_encrypt.  Since the PGP encryption failed to notice this
it XORed the non-encrypted block with the plaintext, effectively
disabling the encryption.

This was found due to a report of PGP encryption not respecting
the pgcrypto.builtin_crypto_enabled flag and allowing Blowfish
and DES.  This however turned out to be a false positive, since
the PGP code only use ciphers from OpenSSL and not the built in
ciphers.

Bug: #19457
Reported-by: Shishir Sharma <ansh01072001@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/19457-4bab15c17aea36c7@postgresql.org
Security: CVE-2026-14663
Backpatch-through: 14
The previous commit raises an ERROR during PGP operations if OpenSSL
does not support the cipher in use. However, any existing messages
created with faulty encryption will no longer be accessible via
pgp_[sym|pub]_decrypt().

To help users out of this situation, add a new ignore-cipher-failure
option which reverts to the broken behavior during decryption only. A
faulty encryption wrapper, created by an OpenSSL configuration that does
not support the cipher, can then be stripped back off by that same
OpenSSL in order to safely reencrypt it. (Note that when OpenSSL does
support the cipher, corrupted messages will not be decrypted regardless
of the ignore-cipher-failure setting; this is unchanged.)

The new tests add a corrupted Blowfish message for both public- and
symmetric-key decryption, resulting in the following test matrix:

- Blowfish supported, default behavior:      fails to decrypt
- Blowfish supported, ignore-cipher-failure: fails to decrypt
- Blowfish unsupported, default behavior:    fails to load cipher
- Blowfish unsupported, ignore-cipher-failure: strips faulty encryption

The previous commit's change to the pubkey tests is expanded similarly:
correctly encrypted messages cannot be decrypted by an OpenSSL that does
not support the cipher, regardless of the option's setting, though the
failure mode will change.

Suggested-by: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Reviewed-by: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
Security: CVE-2026-14663
Backpatch-through: 14
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7 participants