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Add an opt-in protected request exchange for Strands Box - #4007

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@freeqaz-openai freeqaz-openai commented Oct 29, 2026 •

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Add an opt-in Box reference sender for a bounded HTTPS model request. Box applies its policy and keeps the client connection; the OCE sender uses the existing Credential Proxy exchange to resolve material, request permission before the origin write, and check the response before handing it back to Box.

The reference includes a reproducible downstream Box source patch and a launcher for the hosted runtime. It does not enable protected mode for an installed Agent. Native execution enrollment, supervisor-only credential projection, and an installed no-bypass test are separate prerequisites.

A bounded Responses request from the OpenAI Node SDK 7.5.0 can use a public placeholder instead of a provider key. The sender drops the placeholder and SDK diagnostics and injects only the credential selected by OCE. Other authorization values and unsupported headers are refused before material lookup. Local checks cover withdrawal, a lost reply, replacement, and packaged startup refusal.

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clawsweeper Bot commented Oct 29, 2026 •

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🦞👀
ClawSweeper picked this up.

Pull request received. I will update this pull request when review starts.

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@clawsweeper clawsweeper Bot added the clawsweeper:intake:feature Preliminary submission classification; full source review pending. label Oct 29, 2026
@clawsweeper clawsweeper Bot added P2 Normal priority bug or improvement with limited blast radius. merge-risk: 🚨 security-boundary 🚨 Merging this PR could weaken sandboxing, authorization, credentials, or sensitive data. rating: 🧂 unranked krab Not merge-ready due to missing proof or serious correctness/safety concerns. status: 📣 needs proof The PR needs real behavior proof before ClawSweeper can clear the contributor ask. and removed clawsweeper:intake:feature Preliminary submission classification; full source review pending. labels Oct 29, 2026
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clawsweeper Bot commented Oct 29, 2026

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Codex review: needs real behavior proof before merge.

What this changes

This PR adds an optional Rust sender that connects Strands Box requests to OCE’s existing signed Credential Proxy exchange.

Example: A client sends POST /v1/responses with Authorization: Bearer oce-placeholder.

  • Before: Box has no OCE terminal sender for this request.
  • After: The reference sender discards the placeholder, injects the OCE-selected credential, obtains send permission, and withholds the response until OCC approves release.

Review scores

Measure Result What it means
Overall readiness 🧂 unranked krab (1/6) The reference transport has meaningful integration coverage, but regular Agent delivery, native authority qualification, and compatibility proof for the downstream serialized record changes remain incomplete.
Proof confidence 🧂 unranked krab (1/6) Real behavior proof is necessary before merge. See Before merge.
Patch quality 🦐 gold shrimp (3/6) Security review found an item that needs attention.

Product

Kind: Feature · Worth it: Yes · Fix scope: Complete
User problem: A Box-hosted client needs to make an authorized model request without receiving the provider credential.
Reason: The collaborator-authored direction provides a concrete reference implementation and preserves the existing Credential Proxy authority; installed Agent protection remains explicitly outside the delivered scope.

Merge readiness

⛔ Blocked before merge - 5 items remain

Keep this maintainer-authored draft open: it adds a useful reference sender, but the required regular Agent integration is deferred.

Priority: P2
Reviewed head: f63219f99fd991470627cd29e8ffa10dd9ba7f82

Before merge

  • Add real behavior proof - Authority-chain proof required: the reference harness exercises the real signed exchange, IAM withdrawal, and fixture-reported replacement, but supplied evidence does not establish successful native enrollment or exclusion of an untrusted same-UID workload before descriptor execution. Provide redacted native final-effect evidence for the admitted supervisor and forbidden workload, plus withdrawal and replacement behavior; redact credentials and non-public endpoints. The exact-head sender check passed, but its downloadable logs were blocked by this review environment, which alone creates no contributor defect. After adding proof, update the PR body, then request a new review with @clawsweeper re-review. The PR author or someone with repository write access can request it.
  • Connect the launcher to the regular Agent lifecycle before shipping (P2) - The new launcher is only packaged as a standalone executable: no application, Driver, or deployment caller selects it or provisions its required enrollment inputs. Consequently an Agent created and deployed through OCE cannot use this capability. The reference tests start a separate gateway, while native checks only prove startup refusal. AGENTS.md requires new capabilities to have callers in the regular Agent workflow and explicitly excludes test-only integration. Join this entry point to the owning native Sandbox lifecycle, or defer the runtime addition until that integration is available.
  • Resolve security concern: Establish the receiver’s supervisor-only reachability - The receiver validates peer UID and launch framing, then executes the last received descriptor as its image. The documented private container and socket placement are therefore security prerequisites; no supplied installed scenario establishes that a same-UID workload cannot reach this final effect. This is an unproven boundary, not a demonstrated exploit.
  • Resolve merge risk - Before merge, the author must establish that an untrusted same-UID workload cannot reach the new container launch socket and supply executable or configuration descriptors to the receiver.
  • Add data-model compatibility proof - The review found that existing stored data may not work after upgrade. Show that existing data still loads and works with this change.

Findings

  • [P2] Connect the launcher to the regular Agent lifecycle before shipping — runtimes/strands-credential-proxy/src/launcher.rs:45-50
  • [medium] Establish the receiver’s supervisor-only reachability — runtimes/strands-credential-proxy/upstream/box-request-exchange.patch:2735

Tests

  • Missing end-to-end proof: The supplied suites do not exercise a successfully enrolled native launcher through the regular OCE Agent workflow, including the nearest forbidden workload and replacement or revocation before final effects.
Agent review details

How this fits together

Box applies request policy and retains the client connection; the new sender exchanges signed authorization messages with OCC and sends one pinned HTTPS request to the provider.

flowchart TB
  Agent[Regular OCE Agent lifecycle] -. pending integration .-> Launcher[Native Box launcher]
  Launcher --> Box[Box policy and client writer]
  Client[Reference HTTPS client] --> Box
  Box --> Sender[Protected sender]
  Sender --> Authority[OCC Credential Proxy]
  Sender --> Provider[Pinned HTTPS provider]
  Authority --> Sender
  Sender --> Box
Loading

Technical review

Best possible solution:

Connect the sender through the native Sandbox Driver’s regular Agent lifecycle and qualify its enrollment, isolation, withdrawal, and response-custody boundaries.

Do we have a high-confidence way to reproduce the issue?

This is a new capability; source inspection establishes the standalone reference path and the missing regular Agent caller, without executing target code.

Is this the best way to solve the issue?

Reusing the existing signed Credential Proxy exchange preserves its authorization owner, but the sender needs platform lifecycle integration to satisfy the repository’s delivery contract.

Full review comments:

  • [P2] Connect the launcher to the regular Agent lifecycle before shipping — runtimes/strands-credential-proxy/src/launcher.rs:45-50
    The new launcher is only packaged as a standalone executable: no application, Driver, or deployment caller selects it or provisions its required enrollment inputs. Consequently an Agent created and deployed through OCE cannot use this capability. The reference tests start a separate gateway, while native checks only prove startup refusal. AGENTS.md requires new capabilities to have callers in the regular Agent workflow and explicitly excludes test-only integration. Join this entry point to the owning native Sandbox lifecycle, or defer the runtime addition until that integration is available.
    Confidence: 0.97

Overall correctness: patch is incorrect
Overall confidence: 0.9

AGENTS.md: found and applied where relevant.

Codex review notes: model internal, reasoning medium; reviewed against aa2cfe543b3b.

Merge-risk options

Maintainer options:

  1. Qualify the container handoff (recommended)
    Exercise the real installer and receiver with the admitted supervisor and a same-UID workload, proving that only the supervisor can cause the transferred image to execute.
  2. Retain the draft boundary
    Keep the native handoff unlanded until its owning Sandbox integration supplies the required isolation evidence.

Provenance checked

Testing

Proof path: in-process harness.

Security

Needs attention: The native descriptor handoff needs isolation evidence before its same-UID peer check can establish the intended supervisor boundary.

Evidence

Security concerns:

  • [medium] Establish the receiver’s supervisor-only reachability — runtimes/strands-credential-proxy/upstream/box-request-exchange.patch:2735
    The receiver validates peer UID and launch framing, then executes the last received descriptor as its image. The documented private container and socket placement are therefore security prerequisites; no supplied installed scenario establishes that a same-UID workload cannot reach this final effect. This is an unproven boundary, not a demonstrated exploit.
    Confidence: 0.94

What I checked:

  • Applicable integration requirement: The complete root AGENTS.md requires capabilities to have callers in the regular Agent workflow and explicitly rejects test-only callers; no nested AGENTS.md or maintainer-notes directory was found. (AGENTS.md:75, f63219f99fd9)
  • Pinned introduction: Reviewed the introduced merge-base-to-head change, including the downstream Box patch; unrelated base-only console changes were excluded. (f63219f99fd9)
  • Deferred platform caller: The README confirms that main has no native Box Driver and that enrollment, authenticated Harness binding, and installed no-bypass checks remain prerequisites; caller searches found only the standalone reference gateway and optional launcher. (runtimes/strands-credential-proxy/README.md:129, f63219f99fd9)
  • Real transport coverage with fixture enrollment: The integration test launches the compiled reference gateway against the production signed TLS authority and controlled HTTPS origin, checks zero application bytes after withdrawal, and simulates replacement by changing reported instance evidence. (tests/integration/strands-protected-sender.test.ts:83, f63219f99fd9)
  • Additional authority-bearing handoff: The bundled patch adds a same-UID Unix peer check followed by receipt of executable/configuration descriptors and execution of the transferred image; its security depends on installer-provided isolation of that socket. (runtimes/strands-credential-proxy/upstream/box-request-exchange.patch:2735, f63219f99fd9)
  • Persisted downstream format change: The downstream patch adds the serialized container-agent setting and record version 24; supplied startup checks exercise invalid installations rather than populated existing Box state. (runtimes/strands-credential-proxy/upstream/box-request-exchange.patch:896, f63219f99fd9)

Likely related people:

  • Free Wortley: Raw commit ba5cbde adds docs/flows/credential-source-egress.md:12 relative to its recorded parents. This identifies author metadata, not feature responsibility or a PR merger. (role: source-line author; confidence: high; commits: ba5cbde64f9e; files: docs/flows/credential-source-egress.md)
  • Free Wortley: Raw commit 9663174 adds tests/helpers/certificates.mjs:33 relative to its recorded parents. This identifies author metadata, not feature responsibility or a PR merger. (role: source-line author; confidence: high; commits: 9663174fadc5; files: tests/helpers/certificates.mjs)

Labels

Label changes:

  • add P2: This is an optional platform capability with limited immediate user exposure.
  • add merge-risk: 🚨 security-boundary: The downstream container transport accepts authority-bearing descriptors and executes a transferred image using same-UID peer authentication plus installer isolation.
  • add rating: 🧂 unranked krab: Overall readiness is 🧂 unranked krab; proof is 🧂 unranked krab and patch quality is 🦐 gold shrimp.
  • add status: 📣 needs proof: The PR needs real behavior proof before ClawSweeper can clear the contributor ask.

Label justifications:

  • P2: This is an optional platform capability with limited immediate user exposure.
  • merge-risk: 🚨 security-boundary: The downstream container transport accepts authority-bearing descriptors and executes a transferred image using same-UID peer authentication plus installer isolation.
  • rating: 🧂 unranked krab: Overall readiness is 🧂 unranked krab; proof is 🧂 unranked krab and patch quality is 🦐 gold shrimp.
  • status: 📣 needs proof: The PR needs real behavior proof before ClawSweeper can clear the contributor ask.

Rank-up moves

Optional improvements that raise the rating; they are not merge blockers.

  • Prove the native receiver rejects the nearest forbidden same-UID workload before executing transferred descriptors.
  • Show existing Box records remain usable with settings intact, and verify the intentional version-24 transition for container-agent selection.

Rating scale

6/6 🦀 challenger crab · 5/6 🦞 diamond lobster · 4/6 🐚 platinum hermit · 3/6 🦐 gold shrimp · 2/6 🦪 silver shellfish · 1/6 🧂 unranked krab. Overall follows the weaker of proof and patch quality; ✨ marks media proof (a screenshot, video, or linked artifact) that directly shows the changed behavior.

Workflow

ClawSweeper edits this one comment on every review. Comment @clawsweeper re-review for a fresh review only. Repair and merge execution lanes are retired.

Reviewed October 28, 2026, 10:06 PM ET / October 29, 2026, 02:06 UTC.

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Labels

merge-risk: 🚨 security-boundary 🚨 Merging this PR could weaken sandboxing, authorization, credentials, or sensitive data. P2 Normal priority bug or improvement with limited blast radius. rating: 🧂 unranked krab Not merge-ready due to missing proof or serious correctness/safety concerns. status: 📣 needs proof The PR needs real behavior proof before ClawSweeper can clear the contributor ask.

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