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Add /deploy and /rollback skills#3219

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release-skills-splitfrom
deploy-rollback-skills
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Add /deploy and /rollback skills#3219
x3c41a wants to merge 1 commit into
release-skills-splitfrom
deploy-rollback-skills

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@x3c41a
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@x3c41a x3c41a commented Feb 17, 2026

Summary

  • /deploy [version] — trigger and monitor ArgoCD deployment via gh workflow run deploy.yml
  • /rollback [version] — roll back to a previous version with commit diff visibility

Updates /release and /release-finalize to reference /deploy instead of manual workflow instructions.

Depends on #3218.

Test plan

  • gh workflow run deploy.yml --ref v<VERSION> syntax matches deploy.yml (github.ref_name)
  • Cross-references: /release-finalize/deploy/check-health
  • Frontmatter matches existing skill patterns

Close the release-to-deploy loop by adding skills that trigger and
monitor the deploy.yml workflow via `gh workflow run`, replacing the
manual "go click the button" instructions in /release and
/release-finalize.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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cla-bot-2021 Bot commented Feb 17, 2026

User @claude, please sign the CLA here.

@x3c41a
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x3c41a commented Feb 26, 2026

Are those needed? Are those correct rollback and deploy skills?

We handle deploy as part of the release skill but we do not have rollback skill at all...

@x3c41a x3c41a marked this pull request as draft February 26, 2026 15:07
@MN0B
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MN0B commented Mar 3, 2026

(TL;DR - please don't do this before resolving my worries !! giving an AI deploy/rollback access is incredibly risky)

I'm highly concerned by a lack of human in the loop here - what does an autonomous "/deploy" or "/rollback" actually mean in practice?

Let me check I understand:

Claude reads local code/logs/PRs -> decides to use a deployment tool -> executes infrastructure changes

What prevents a prompt injection from a poisoned dependency or malicious PR description? - an attacker could hide instructions telling the agent to trigger an unauthorised deployment or teardown.

How do you know Claude is going to do what you expect it to do, like deploying the correct branch to the correct environment? (its non deterministic)

What are the accesses for the cloud/deployment credentials used - how are they isolated from the agent so they can't be stolen if the agent's context window is compromised?

Are these skills going to be wired into automated CI, or strictly run locally by engineers?

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2 participants